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Abstract—Future communication networks are envisioned to
be based upon a new communication paradigm which is user
centric, i.e., users have freedom to choose a service provider
to maximize their utilities. Pricing schemes adopted by service
providers will impact the decision of users in selecting networks.
In this paper, we formulate the problem as a Markov Decision
Process (MDP) framework and apply Q-learning to design an
optimal pricing policy that aims to maximize the long term
revenue of the service provider. By applying dynamic pricing,
each service provider operates an optimal policy to maximize its
revenue. Simulation results show that our proposed framework
is successful in maximizing the service provider’s revenue while
supporting an appropriate level of user satisfaction in terms of
price and call level quality of service.
Keywords-revenue maximization; MDP; dynamic pricing; Q-
learning; service provider
I. INTRODUCTION
Network heterogeneity is a common feature of 4G where
multiple access networks will coexist to support ubiquitous
wireless services. These heterogeneous wireless networks typ-
ically differ in terms of coverage, data rate, latency and loss
rate [1]. Moreover with the advent of sophisticated mobile
devices and terminals, mobile users could subscribe service
providers for a short duration against a current scenario of
contractual agreement. This scenario is referred to as Always
Best Connected (ABC) [2]. In such highly competitive en-
vironments, pricing will be one of the most important issues.
Pricing schemes adopted by service providerswill signiﬁcantly
impact the decision of each mobile user in selecting a network.
Through an appropriate pricing policy, the service provider
can maximize its revenue, while mobile users achieve high
satisfaction from the chosen service providers.
In the current scenario, service providers follow a static
charging model, i.e., a ﬂat charging model based upon per
minute duration or for a speciﬁc subscription period during
which users can have limited or unlimited usage of services.
This charging model is independent of the current state of
the network and does not consider any engineering issues
This work was supported by the IT R&D program of MKE/KEIT.
[KI001809, Intelligent Wireless Communication Systems in 3 Dimensional
Environment]
This research work is sponsored by “Higher Education Commission (HEC),
Govt. Of Pakistan” under the scholarship program titled: MS Level Training
in Korean Universities/Industry.
related with the pricing mechanism that results in revenue loss.
However, in such competing environments, service providers
have the potential to increase their revenue using customized
prices designed according to users’ satisfaction and personal
beneﬁt. Therefore, a dynamic pricing scheme plays a very
important role in achieving the goal of revenue maximization.
Most of the previous studies consider the pricing and
revenue maximization problem from two perspectives: com-
petitive and non-competitive [3]. In a competitive pricing
model, competition between service providers or between a
service provider and users is established and a game theoretic
approach is used to model this type of competition. This ap-
proach usually runs in either a cooperative or non-cooperative
manner.
This paper considers a dynamic pricing problem for rev-
enue maximization under the framework of Markov Decision
Process (MDP). We apply reinforcement learning to learn the
system gradually from user’s behavior, and propose an optimal
pricing policy that dynamically adjusts the offered price of the
service provider. A solution that achieves the satisfaction of
all entities is desirable.
The contributions of this paper are three-fold: i) it considers
dynamic pricing for revenue maximization, ii) it investigates
the problem under the framework of MDP and applies re-
inforcement learning, iii) it determines an optimal policy
to adjust a service provider’s offered price dynamically to
increase the total revenue for the service provider.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the related work. The system model and assumptions
are provided in Section III. We formulate the problem in
Section IV, and introduce Q-learning algorithm in Section V.
Simulation results for performance comparison are provided
in Section VI. Future work and concluding remarks are given
in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Under assumptions of competitive wireless networks, there
are several recent studies [1], [4]–[7]. Most of the previous
works focused on determining the existence of unique equi-
librium solution, e.g., Nash or Stackelberg equilibrium. The
authors in [4] formulated an evolutionary stochastic game
and determined the Nash equilibrium (price). Under the sameassumptions, the study of Lin and Das in [5] showed that either
a dominant strategy for service provider or Nash equilibrium
exists. Their proposed framework signiﬁcantly increases ser-
vice provider’s revenue. They pointed that pricing must be
included and should be dynamic in nature, but they did not
consider the pricing effect.
Under the same assumptions, the authors in [7] developed a
new admission control and a scalable pricing policy using non-
cooperative game theory by incorporating sigmoid utility1.
Backward induction was used to solve the game and Nash
equilibrium was achieved within the sub game. However, they
did not propose changing in current pricing policy and also
pointed that the improvement in the current pricing scheme is
essential. We also use the same user satisfaction sigmoid utility
proposed in [7]. However, our objective is different and we
formulate the problem differently using an MDP framework
and Q-learning is applied to determine an optimal policy that
aim at maximizing the network revenue by incorporating the
dynamic pricing.
Dynamic pricing under framework of game theory was
studied in [1] and the references there in. However, all these
studies were based on determining Nash equilibrium (price).
To guarantee call level and packet level quality of service
(QoS), many QoS metrics were proposed in [8] under ana-
lytical framework. MDP and Q-learning framework is widely
used in wireless networks to study call admission control,
wireless resource management, cell conﬁguration, handoff
under heterogeneous network and spectrum access schemes
[9]–[12].
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
We consider a wireless cellular scenario where multiple base
stations (BSs) operate in a common service area and manage
their independent pricing policy. These BSs can belong to
single or different service providers as shown in Fig. 1. We
consider a distributed approachand focus our study for a single
BS case. Service providers charge each ongoing call with price
pb ∈ P based on the current condition of its network. Because
of the lack of information about the performance and payoff a
service provider obtain at certain time, service providers have
to learn gradually and change its decision. A price announced
by a BS at any time greatly impacts the users to initiate
connections. We assume that users’ arrival rate is a function of
price offered by service provider and normal price. If the price
offered by the service provider is higher than the normal price,
the connections arrival rate will signiﬁcantly decrease and if
the price is less than the normal price, the connection arrival
rate will increase signiﬁcantly. Therefore, user’s connection
rate can be modeled as [4].
¯ λ = λ

exp

−(
pb
P0
− 1)
2
. (1)
where pb is the price announced by service provider b ∈ B
and P0 is the normal price (average offered price in the com-
1A user satisfaction function used to model user satisfaction in terms of
price and packet blocking probability.
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Fig. 1. Different BSs belong to different service providers or single service
provider has overlaid coverage area and manages its prices pb.
mon service area). Service providers adopt dynamic pricing
mechanism for a possible control on QoS.
¿From the users point of view, who are under a common
service of multiple BSs, users attachment with a service
provider is per connection duration only and users are certain
price and QoS sensitive. We model user’s sensitivity in terms
of user’s satisfaction, which describes that how sensitive the
users are to changes in price and QoS. Degradation in the QoS
will cause the users to churn from serving service provider.
These users’s sensitivity is modeled in section IV.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We formulate the dynamic pricing and revenue maximiza-
tion problem as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) [13]. The
notable solution variants are value iteration, policy iteration
and linear programming. However, these classical and model
based solutions suffer from “curse of dimensionality” and
modeling as they require prior knowledge of state transition
probabilities. These solutions are ineffective in large scale and
complex problems. To tackle these problems, we use reinforce-
ment learning approach which is even suitable when the state
space become computationally intractable. So, we propose Q-
Learning based solution to determine an optimal pricing policy
for the revenue maximization in wireless networks.
A. Problem Formulation as a MDP
A ﬁnite state system in a generic network is considered
where the system changes its state with each arrival and
departure of on-going calls. BS periodically adjusts its offered
price to adopt changes in network conditions. We assume that
each state is a Markovian state that is independent of the pasthistory of the system and retains all the relevant information of
the system, and that an action is chosen based on the current
state of the network. With each state change the network earns
a reward. The objective is to optimize the action (offered price)
that maximize the long term reward of the network. The detail
problem formulation is as follows.
•State-space: The network is represented by a discrete time
system with a ﬁnite number of feasible states identiﬁed by
S =

c
nc(t)δc ≤ C. (2)
where nc is the number of connections of class-c at time
t, δc is bandwidth requirement of class-c user, and C is
the capacity of system. Connections initiation requests follow
Poisson distribution with mean arrival rate λ from (1) and call
holding time is exponentially distributed with mean 1/μ.
•Action space: The feasible pricing range offered by the
network is modeled as a feasible action space. At each decision
epoch the state of the wireless network will change and
according to its new state the network announces a new price
among feasible offered price set. The action space in a state
s is
A
s = P =[ p1,p 2,···pn]. (3)
•Decision epoch: In wireless network, a new terminal
initiate or terminate a connection the state of the network
changes accordingly, the natural decision epoch is a call arrival
or departure instance. Therefore, the service provider adjusts
the price at each decision epoch.
•Reward function: Because our proposed scheme is user
centric, we propose an accumulated reward as the sum of user
satisfactions. If a function contributes positively [negatively]
towards user satisfaction, it will be added [subtracted] for the
accumulated reward function. Let r(s,a) denote the immediate
reward the system get if a ∈ P is chosen in a system state s,
and we have
r(s,a)=
 
u=1,2···U yu(u+
u − u−
u ) , system stable
0 ,o t h e r w i s e .
(4)
We assume that the system is stable under a scheduling and
call admission control. In (4), u+
u [u−
u] contribute positively
[negatively] towards the user satisfaction and yu is the weight
associated with each utility function. As the system behavior
is the same for all ongoing connections, any unstable situation
means all ongoing connections experience the same situation
and that turn the immediate reward into zero. For example,
a threshold based QoS user satisfaction function contributes
negative towards accumulated reward. When the QoS offered
by the network exceeds the predeﬁned threshold, all the users
will churn from that network and the resulting reward will be
zero.
The sigmoid function has been widely used to capture user
satisfaction [1], [5], [7] and the references there in. We use
the same sigmoid utility proposed in [7]. The positive and
negative user satisfactions as functions of offered price p is
given by
u
+
1 (p)=

1
1+e
−Lc(Pc
0
−p) , p ≤ P c
0
0 ,o t h e r w i s e
(5)
and
u
−
1 (p)=

1
1+e
Lc(Pc
0
−p) , p>P c
0
0 ,o t h e r w i s e ,
(6)
respectively.
In the function, Lc is a constant which represents the
steepness of these functions for class-c users, P c
0 is the normal
price and u
+
1 [u
−
1 ] shows this function contributes positively
[negatively] towards accumulated reward of the system.
To guarantee the packet level QoS for ongoing connections,
we model user churning behavior through a packet delay. We
assume that each ongoing call has certain QoS threshold re-
quirement represented by dc
max for class-c user. A degradation
in the offered QoS will increase the churning rate from the
serving service provider. The packet delay is calculated simply
by M/M/1 queuing analysis [14]. So, we have the second user
satisfaction function as
u
−
2 (d)=
1
1+eKc(dc
max−d). (7)
As a consequence, the immediate reward r(s,a) obtained in
a state s ∈ S with an action a ∈ P is
r(s,a)a∈P =[ y1u
+
1 (p) −{ y1u
−
1 (p)+y2u
−
2 (d)}], (8)
where y1 and y2 is the weight associated with user satisfaction
functions.
V. Q-LEARNING
Q-Learning [15], [16] is a reinforcement learning technique
for solving MDPs when the state transition probabilities are
not known. This technique works by directly learning MDPs’
action value function by interacting with control environment.
In an MDP, the value function is a utility that gives the
expected utility of taking an action in given state. Accordingly,
if the value function is learned, the optimal policy is simply
the set of actions that maximizes the function at each state.
Q-learning provides the following update rule to successively
approximate the value function Q(s,a) referred as Q-function.
The update is taken by
Qt+1(st,a t)=( 1−α)Qt(st,a t)+α[r(st,a t)+γV ∗(st+1)],
(9)
where α ∈ [0,1) is the learning rate showing what extent the
newly acquired information will override the old values and
γ ∈ (0,1] is the discount factor that accounts for importance
of future reward. r(st+1) is the reward received at time step
t and V ∗(st+1) is the value function that maximizes the Q-
function at state st+1 over all actions a.T h a ti s ,
V ∗(st+1)=m a x
at∈P
Qt+1(st,a t). (10)
Since our objective is to determine an optimal policy that
maximize the long term revenue of service provider, the
optimal policy is given by
Q∗
t(st,a)=m a x
a∈P
Qt(st,a). (11)TABLE I
SIMULATIONSETTING
Parameters value
Number of mobile users 100
Connection arrival rate λ in (1) 1-18/min
Mean connection holding time μ 1min
Weighting factor y1 10
Weighting factor y2 30
Max tolerable delay dmax 0.05sec
Normal price P c
0 1.6
Static charging price 1.3
Offered Price p 1.0-2.0units/min
Learning rate α 0.6
Discount factor γ 0.9
The optimal policy is the action with the best Q-value
in each state. Since a greedy policy causes the system to
converge to a locally optimal solution, where the behavior of
the greedy scheme can be sub-optimal because its decisions
are based on maximization of local reward. Therefore, it is
necessary to visit all the sets of possible actions for all states
to ﬁnd the globally optimum solution. This is the “exploration/
exploitation dilemma” [10]. An action of state is selected from
the feasible action set using an exploitation and exploration
policy.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, simulation results are presented to illustrate
the performance of our proposed scheme.
We consider a single hot spot cell with varied trafﬁc load.
The trafﬁc load varies according to (1). The mobile users
are uniformly distributed and the new connection arrival rate
follows Poisson distribution and connection duration is expo-
nentially distributed with mean 1 min. We assume that users
generate persistent data trafﬁc and always have data to send
for the connection period. Data packets generated by each user
are aggregated at the system and the system is able to support
aggregated generated trafﬁc (i.e., stable) under a scheduling
and call admission control scheme. Only single class real time
trafﬁc with a delay constraint 0.05 sec is considered. The other
parameter settings are described in Table I. The simulation is
run under varied connection arrival rate and the results are
averaged over 20 runs. For the purpose of comparison, we
consider a greedy scheme that always considers the maximum
possible reward at any decision epoch and does not consider
the long term effect of the policy for revenue maximization.
First, we vary the connection arrival rate and the result
is shown in Fig. 2. The decision is made at each decision
epoch, i.e., whenever the state of the network change on
connection arrival and departure instance. Therefore, the price
offered at each decision epoch is averaged over all states for
each arrival rate. Mean price offered by the service provider
decreases [increases] with the decrease [increase] of the arrival
rate. When the connection arrival rate is small, the service
provider should set low price to attract more users for initiating
connections.However, for moderatelylarge connectionsarrival
rate the service provider can set high price to maximize its
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Fig. 2. Mean price according to arrival rate.
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Fig. 3. Total network revenue according to arrival rate.
revenue. Another reason to set high price is to restrict higher
arrival rate, and it grantees QoS for ongoing connections.
Fig. 3 shows the revenue of the service provider. Our pro-
posed scheme dramatically improves the revenue compared to
the greedy scheme. Since the service provider choose a higher
price for higher arrival rate, the revenue is increased. The
comparison is based on the total revenue generated from all
connections admitted into the network, while Fig. 4 shows the
service provider’s average revenue earned per user. Because
total revenue is increased, average revenue earned per user is
also increased.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we studied the problem of dynamic pricing and
revenue maximization under the framework of Markov Deci-
sion Process (MDP). Because of highly competitive environ-
ments, static pricing schemes do not work properly especially
with high trafﬁc load. We used the reinforcement learning to2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
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Fig. 4. Average revenue per user according to arrival rate.
learn the system gradually and Q-learning algorithm to design
an optimal policy that maximizes the total network revenue
under a dynamic pricing scheme. Simulation results show how
the chargedmean price of the service providervaries according
to the arrival rate, and conﬁrm that the total network revenue
obtained by the service provider is higher under the dynamic
pricing scheme.
As a part of the future work, we would like to extend our
research to consider the stochastic game modeling and to study
its behavior with correlated-Q learning and Nash equilibrium
under competitive environments.
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